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INTRODUCTION
Where transactions require the delicate management of perfectly 
imperfect information, simplifying complexity can lead to significant gains 
in efficiency and effectiveness. The process of merging or acquiring a 
business is such a transaction.  The imprecise art of integrating two 
companies’ histories, cultures, processes, and strategies is intricate.  But 
before companies can integrate their businesses, they must reach an 
agreement to either buy, sell, or merge.  The process leading up to signing 
and closing includes, among other things, financial due diligence, pricing, 
and negotiation of terms and covenants.  Inevitably, this comes with 
 *   J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B., 2012, 
Washington University in St. Louis.  I would like to thank Professor David Skeel for his 
thoughtful guidance and insight throughout the writing process and Adjunct Professor 
Jeffrey Brotman for his feedback and support.  I would also like to thank my friends at the 
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complexities that can lead to wasted time and money. 
This Comment focuses on the executory period of M&A transactions.  
Specifically, it focuses on the pricing process.  There are two main 
methodologies for pricing a deal: (1) the closing accounts mechanism and 
(2) the locked box mechanism.  Through the closing accounts mechanism, 
parties agree to an enterprise value and then adjust post-closing for actual 
Cash, Debt, and Working Capital as of the closing date.1  Through the 
locked box mechanism, parties agree to an equity price based on historic 
balance sheets that are fixed at signing.2  Because the locked box 
mechanism eliminates the need for post-closing financial adjustments, it 
can be a more efficient and effective means to price deals. 
The locked box mechanism is used widely in the United Kingdom but 
less frequently in the United States, where the closing accounts mechanism 
dominates.3  This Comment argues that the United States should capitalize 
 1.  To Lock or Not to Lock: An Introduction to the Locked Box Closing Mechanism,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP 1, 2 (Sept. 2013), 
http://download.pwc.com/ie/pubs/2013_an_introduction_to_the_locked_box.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y4TB-XA3A].  
 2.  Id. at 3.
 3.  William G. Lawlor & Eric S. Siegel, Assessing the Locked Box Approach to 
Purchase Price Adjustments, 6 DEAL LAWYERS 1 (Mar.-Apr. 2012), 
https://www.dechert.com/files/Publication/5c0046f0-600f-4215-b5ac-
0829b868326d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1289a486-2749-4ed4-9caa-
c46abd71412b/deallawyers-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HXK-DUL8] (“Whether the 
locked box achieves critical mass in the U.S. is yet to be determined, . . . .”); Samantha 
McGonigle & Michael Weisser, Q2 2014 Global Private Equity Update: Unlocking 
“Locked Box” Deals, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP: GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY WATCH 1
(July 24, 2014), http://privateequity.weil.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Global-PE-
Update-1H-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Z4H-3FG6] (stating that the locked box mechanism 
has been popular in Europe for its simplicity, but slow to catch on in the United States 
market where it only represents a small minority of deals). See also James D. Epstein, 
Acquiring European Businesses–Differences Between the U.S. and U.K. Practices, 5 CORP.
& M&A L. (BNA) No. 33, at 12 (Nov. 7, 2011) (comparing the differences between the 
United States closing accounts mechanism with the United Kingdom locked box 
mechanism, suggesting the prevalence of each respective mechanism to each region); CMS
European M&A Study 2014, CMS HASCHE SIGLE 1, 5 (Mar. 2014), http://www.cms-
hs.com/newsmedia/publications/pages/default.aspx (follow “Corporate/M&A” hyperlink; 
then follow “CMS European M&A Study 2014” hyperlink under “Publications M&A”; then 
follow “Preview – CMS European M&A Study 2014” under “Publication”) 
[https://perma.cc/U3R5-HFM9] (finding that the closing accounts mechanism is used in 
roughly 85% of United States M&A deals and 43% of United Kingdom M&A deals, 
suggesting that the locked box mechanism or some other pricing mechanism is used in 15%
of United States M&A deals and 57% of United Kingdom M&A deals); Sandro de 
Bernardini & Simon Rootsey, Popularity of Locked-Box Deals in the UK: Price Certainty, 
Other Benefits for Buyers, SKADDEN: INSIGHTS (Sept. 29, 2015), 
https://www.skadden.com/insights/popularity-locked-box-deals-uk-price-certainty-other-
benefits-buyers [https://perma.cc/2X4J-KQ6K] (discussing the rise in locked box deals in 
the United Kingdom).
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on the benefits of the locked box mechanism and use it more frequently.4  It 
prevents post-closing disagreements that can frustrate a deal, it is more 
time and cost efficient, it is simpler, it promotes price certainty, and it 
increases the number of available pricing mechanisms that parties can use, 
which can better satisfy party preferences.  Because the benefits of the 
locked box mechanism are generally undisputed, this Comment evaluates 
possible explanations for the mechanism’s lack of popularity in the United 
States and suggests a means to increase its usage among American parties. 
Parts I and II provide an overview and comparison of the two pricing 
mechanisms.  Part III is the heart of this Comment.  It begins by evaluating 
three primary factors that may have prevented the locked box mechanism 
from gaining popularity in the United States: (1) the volatility of the 
financial market, (2) the rise of carve-out M&A deals, and (3) the 
educational and cultural familiarity with the closing accounts mechanism as 
compared to the locked box mechanism.  For reasons that will later be 
discussed, the United States’ lack of familiarity with the locked box 
mechanism appears to be the most persuasive.  Therefore, this Comment 
suggests structuring the locked box mechanism to conform to the 
expectations of American companies—namely, by including materially 
adverse change (MAC) and earnout clauses by default. 
I. THE CLOSING ACCOUNTS MECHANISM AND THE LOCKED BOX
MECHANISM
A. Closing Accounts Mechanism 
The closing accounts mechanism (“CAM”) has traditionally been the 
default pricing mechanism for deals around the world.5  In the CAM, there 
are two important dates: the sales purchase agreement (“SPA”) signing date 
and the closing date.  The parties first agree to an enterprise value for the 
target company as of the SPA signing date and then adjust this value post-
 4.  In order to improve processes, whether in law, business, medicine, design, or other 
fields, the author believes that experimentation and exploration with existing—yet 
unfamiliar—processes can be insightful and inspiring.  For instance, it may be helpful to 
adapt cross-disciplinary processes to one’s research or, as here, adapt cross-cultural M&A 
mechanisms. See Eva Boxenbaum & Julie Battilana, Importation as Innovation: 
Transposing Managerial Practices Across Fields, 3 STRATEGIC ORG. 355, 356 (2005) 
(defining one process of innovation known as translation, which “occurs when actors adapt 
a foreign practice to their own . . . context, modifying it or combining it with local 
practices”).
 5.  Ronan O’Sullivan et al., Pricing Mechanisms: Locked Box vs Completion 
Accounts, PLC MAG., Jan. 25, 2012, at 1; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 2. 
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closing for “actual Cash, Debt, and Working Capital”6 to derive the equity 
value. 
The enterprise value is determined through an agreed-upon valuation 
methodology that factors in Cash, Debt, and Working Capital.7  This 
calculation is the first step in determining the equity value, which is the 
actual price the buyer pays to the seller after post-closing adjustments have 
been made.8  In some instances, there is an intermediary step where the 
parties create an estimated calculation of the equity value after signing, but 
before closing.9  Then, the buyer makes post-closing adjustments based on 
the accounting methodologies set forth in the negotiated SPA to determine 
the equity value.10  Because the balance sheet that is used for post-closing 
adjustments is not prepared until after the closing date, the equity value 
may not be known for several months or years after closing.11  With the 
CAM, economic interest and risk pass from the seller to the buyer at 
closing because this is the point at which the buyer becomes financially 
responsible for the acquired company. 
B. Locked Box Mechanism 
In the past few years, the locked box mechanism (“LBM”) has 
become a popular alternative to the CAM in the United Kingdom.12  In the 
LBM, there are three important dates: the Locked Box Date, the SPA 
signing date, and the closing date.13  The parties agree to a fixed equity 
value for the target company at the SPA signing date.14  The equity value is 
calculated based on an agreed-upon historic balance sheet (“Locked Box 
Balance Sheet”), which is fixed at the pre-signing date (the “Locked Box 
Date”).15  Between the Locked Box Date and the SPA signing date, the 
 6.  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 2. 
 7.  For instance, enterprise value can be calculated with the following equation: 
“market value of common stock + market value of preferred equity + market value of debt + 
minority interest – cash and investments.” Enterprise Value, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/enterprisevalue.asp [https://perma.cc/TTA3-6R7W] 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2016). 
 8.  O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 2.
 9.  O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 4 (“This use of estimates does not affect the 
ultimate equity price but attempts (in theory, at least) to ensure that the consideration 
actually paid by the buyer at completion is a reasonable approximation of the ultimate 
equity price”). 
 10.  O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 4.
 11.  O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 5. 
 12.  de Bernardini & Rootsey, supra note 3.
 13.  Please note that these dates are listed in chronological order.  
 14.  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 3.
 15.  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 3. 
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seller performs due diligence on the Locked Box Balance Sheet and 
projected cash flows to determine the equity value.16  That equity value is 
fixed at the SPA signing date and does not get adjusted post-closing.17
Notice that the LBM does not require a determination of enterprise value 
because the actual levels of Cash, Debt, and Working Capital are 
cognizable through the historic Locked Box Balance Sheet. 
Because there are no post-closing adjustments, the buyer receives 
protection from any “Leakage,” which is the unpermitted extraction of 
value from the target business in the form of representations and warranty 
indemnity (“W&I”) insurance and covenants between the Locked Box Date 
and closing dates.18  Permitted Leakage is agreed upon in the SPA and may 
not lead to a reduction in price or trigger any W&I insurance.  Unpermitted 
Leakage includes “dividends (whether actual or deemed), management 
fees, transfer of assets at an under-value and the waiver of amounts 
owed/liabilities.”19  Should any unpermitted Leakage occur, the W&I 
insurance will reimburse the buyer for the loss value exceeding the seller’s 
negotiated liability cap (the maximum amount the seller is responsible for 
out-of-pocket before insurance kicks in).20  The W&I provisions in LBM 
deals are generally more stringent than those in CAM deals because they 
are the buyer’s sole form of protection from any unpermitted Leakage in 
the target business between the Locked Box Date and closing.21
With the LBM, the economic interest and risk transfer from buyer to 
seller is set at the Locked Box Date, the date at which the historic balance 
sheet is fixed, because the buyer receives the “benefit of the cash profits 
generated by the business from that date”22 and the seller “incurs an 
opportunity cost as they do not receive payment at the Locked Box Date 
 16.  Jeff Mansfield & Kieren Parker, M&A Purchase Price Calculations–The Locked 




17 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 3. 
 18.  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 5. 
 19.  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 5. 
 20.  Warranty and Indemnity Insurance in UK M&A Deals, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP:
CORP. PRACTICE (July 2015), 
http://interact.winston.com/reaction/Corporate/ClientBriefingNewsletter/2015/Warranty_Ind
emnity_Insurance_JUL2015/Warranty_Indemnity_Insurance_JUL2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/22S5-GH65]; Jay Rittberg et al., M&A in 2015: Reps and Warranties 
Insurance, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT & AIG  17 (Mar. 26, 2015), 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/20150326-ma-in-2015-reps-and-warranties-
insurance-127162.pdf [https://perma.cc/AN62-42QU].  
 21.  Lawlor & Seigel, supra note 3, at 2.
 22.  In effect, the buyer is running the company on behalf of the seller during this 
period.  This idea will be discussed further in subsequent sections. 
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but instead . . . at Closing.”23  To compensate the seller for this opportunity 
cost and for not receiving the cash profits between the Locked Box Date 
and closing, the buyer either pays the seller interest on the equity value or 
an agreed-upon proxy for profits.24
II. THE MECHANISMS COMPARED
FIGURE 1.25
A. The CAM 
The CAM has the primary benefit of “more accurately captur[ing] 
changes in the target’s valuation between the initial valuation . . . date and 
the closing date.”26  Because the CAM considers post-closing adjustments, 
the equity value directly reflects the financial condition of the target 
business at closing.27  Additionally, the CAM is known to be buyer-friendly 
because the seller bears the economic risk until closing and the buyer has 
control over the post-closing adjustments process (and thus, the ability to 
renegotiate for a lower equity price).28  Another benefit of the CAM is its 
 23.  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 7. 
 24.  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 7. 
 25. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 3 fig.1.
 26.  Lawlor & Seigel, supra note 3, at 2. 
27 O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 3. 
28 O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 4, 
8.
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flexibility across multiple deal types, such as strategic, financial, complex 
carve-out,29 corporate, and startup deals.  This flexibility derives from the 
CAM’s ability to capture an accurate financial snapshot of the target 
company at closing. 
However, the CAM leads to “heavy negotiation” (and potential 
“manipulation and abuse”) between the buyer and seller during the post-
closing adjustments period that is “complex, time consuming and 
expensive.”30  Disputes normally occur over pricing, accounting methods, 
and/or policies.31  The buyer has the benefit of conducting due diligence for 
post-closing adjustments and may take advantage of this opportunity to 
renegotiate a lower equity price,32 while the seller may be motivated to 
exploit loopholes in the post-closing adjustments process by, for instance, 
“delaying capex to boost cash.”33  These negotiations also require 
management involvement to agree upon a final purchase price,34 which 
diverts their focus from the intricate task of integrating both companies.  
These drawn-out debates can come at great economic cost to the parties in 
the form of fees to attorneys, bankers, and accountants.35  They can also 
result in significant delays, with disputes lasting anywhere from months36
 29.  McGonigle & Weisser, supra note 3, at 3.
 30.  McGonigle & Weisser, supra note 3, at 3. 
 31.  Alexander B. Johnson et al., Trends in Purchase Price Adjustment Formulations in 
US, UK and Cross-Border M&A Transactions, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (June 2013), 
http://www.financierworldwide.com/trends-in-purchase-price-adjustment-formulations-in-
us-uk-and-cross-border-ma-transactions/#.VvQIHhIrLVo [https://perma.cc/9EV2-26SH].   
 32.  Lower Due Diligence in M&A Linked to Increase in Deal Success But Lower 
Premiums, CASS BUS. SCH., CITY UNIV. LONDON (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://www.cass.city.ac.uk/news-and-events/news/2013/november/longer-due-diligence-in-
m-and-a-linked-to-increase-in-deal-success-but-lower-premiums [https://perma.cc/KS85-
5EHS]. See also Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Law as Rationalization: Getting Beyond Reason to 
Business Ethics, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 959, 1017 (2006) (discussing an instance where a 
particular seller had to balance its leverage during post-closing adjustments with its distrust 
for the buyer’s ability to “perform a fair post-closing adjustment”). 
 33.  Mansfield & Parker, supra note 16, at 2.  This can have the effect of artificially 
raising the value of the target firm because delaying capital expenditures until the merger is 
complete will only boost cash in the short-term.   
 34.  McGonigle & Weisser, supra note 3, at 3.
 35.  See McGonigle & Weisser, supra note 3, at 3 (noting how the locked box 
mechanism eliminates costs associated with negotiating post-closing adjustments); 
O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 5-6 (noting how the locked box mechanism eliminates the 
costs involved with preparing and reviewing disputes caused by the closing adjustments 
mechanism); PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 4 (discussing how the locked box 
mechanism can result in “potentially significant time and cost savings” because it eliminates 
post-closing adjustments). 
 36.  Press Release, Jon Greer, New M&A Study Lifts the Curtain on What Happens 
After Companies Are Sold (Apr. 6, 2011), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110406005612/en/MA-Study-Lifts-Curtain-
Companies-Sold [https://perma.cc/MQ3P-LBRS] (finding that disputes last an average of 
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to years.37
Lastly, the CAM is known as a buyer-friendly mechanism because 
economic interest passes at closing, which may be problematic for the 
seller.38  The seller is liable for any possible downturn in the business, 
which would likely result in a decrease in purchase price.  Additionally, the 
buyer controls the post-closing adjustments process, which gives the seller 
less control over the final purchase price.39
B. The LBM 
The LBM has four primary benefits.  First, the mechanism is more 
time and cost efficient because there are no risks or expenditures of money 
or time associated with renegotiating post-closing adjustments.40  Speed is 
integral in determining the success of M&A deals,41 so efficiency gains can 
materially benefit both parties to a transaction.  For instance, the buyer’s 
management team can allocate more time to planning and preparing for the 
integration of the target company rather than spending their efforts on post-
closing adjustments under a CAM deal.  Second, the LBM simplifies the 
SPA agreement because there is no need to negotiate or include complex 
post-closing calculation formulas.42  The absence of these processes can 
further streamline the deal.  Third, the fixed priced of the LBM promotes 
price certainty for both the buyer and seller.43  This reduces the price 
uncertainty that a buyer may have with the CAM because there is no 
concern over the potential need to secure additional capital should the 
equity value increase beyond the initial enterprise value.44  This also 
reduces the price uncertainty from the seller’s perspective by eliminating 
eight months). 
 37.  O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 4. 
 38.  O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 4.
 39.  O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 4. 
 40.  McGonigle & Weisser, supra note 3, at 3; O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 6. See
Brian Vickrey et al., An Introduction to the Locked Box Closing Mechanism: To Lock or Not 
to Lock, TRANSACTION ADVISORS (Oct. 2013), 
https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/introduction-locked-box-closing-mechanism 
[https://perma.cc/9CR3-8GWS] (stating that the locked box mechanism is a good alternative 
for buyers and sellers looking for ways to reduce the lengthy process of preparing, 
reviewing, and disputing post-closing adjustments).
 41.  See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 472 (Vickie Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2012) (“Speed is almost 
always desirable in acquisition transactions.  In dynamic markets, the conditions that make 
an agreement advantageous may suddenly change . . . and . . . it is rational, once a deal is 
reached, for business people to be impatient to close it”).  
 42.  de Bernardini & Rootsey, supra note 3.
 43.  McGonigle & Weisser, supra note 3, at 3; O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 6. 
 44.  O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 5.
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concerns over a reduction in equity value through price-chipping post-
closing.45  The fixed price promotes certainty between both parties and 
allows the buyer and seller to better manage their financial futures.  And 
fourth, the LBM provides an alternative pricing mechanism for companies 
to structure deals, which may better satisfy buyer and/or seller preferences 
or may be more effective for particular deal types.  For instance, the LBM 
can be a beneficial tool for private equity sellers where price certainty 
“allows a PE [“private equity”] seller to make a full distribution to LPs 
shortly after closing and does not require the buyer to find additional cash 
to fund any upwards adjustment[.]”46  This is one of the reasons why 
private equity firms in the United Kingdom favor the LBM.47  Additionally, 
having the ability to choose between the LBM or CAM can help parties 
better manage market conditions.  When markets are stable, parties can 
default to the efficiency of the LBM by relying on historic balance sheets.  
On the other hand, when markets are unstable, such as during the financial 
crisis, parties may opt for the CAM for a real-time snapshot of the target 
company’s value at closing.48  For corporate strategists, the power of choice 
is a valuable tool. 
The LBM also has its limitations.  It is less precise because it does not 
factor in post-closing adjustments.  It is also not typically appropriate for 
three types of situations: where isolating the historic financial statements of 
a target business is difficult (e.g., certain types of carve-outs49 or 
divestitures); where historic financial statements are limited (e.g., startups); 
or where the buyer does not trust the seller.50  The CAM may be more 
appropriate in complex carve-out deals because the LBM may be difficult 
to apply “without an anchored balance sheet.”51  This will be discussed in 
greater detail in a subsequent section, but the main takeaway is that a seller 
may not be able to effectively isolate the carved-out business unit’s 
financial statements from its other business units.  With the CAM, the 
seller can begin to account for the carved-out business unit’s financial 
 45.  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 4. 
 46.  McGonigle & Weisser, supra note 3, at 3. 
 47.  Lawlor & Siegel, supra note 3, at 1.
 48.  See note 85 for a data-driven discussion on how the financial crisis affected the use 
of the LBM in the United Kingdom.
49 McGonigle & Weisser, supra note 3, at 3. 
50 Mansfield & Parker, supra note 16, at 2.
 51.  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 8.  For purposes of this Comment, 
complex carve-out deals refer to situations where a seller is unable to isolate the financial 
statements of the target business unit from those of its other businesses.  For example, 
assume that Seller has three business units: A, B, and C (note that these are not distinct 
businesses and that Seller is not a holding company).  Buyer contracts with Seller to 
purchase A, but Seller has not maintained separate financial statements for A, B, and C.  As 
a result, information, such as revenues from A, are combined with revenues from B and C.  
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information when the agreement is signed and have the financial statements 
ready at closing for any adjustments.  Note, however, that there are a 
number of carve-out deals where financial statements for individual 
business units exist.  As such, the LBM has been used successfully in many 
carve-out deals in the United Kingdom.52  The CAM may also be more 
appropriate in startup deals because young companies lack the necessary 
historic financial statements for the LBM, and the CAM allows the buyer to 
create an accurate snapshot of the company’s value at closing.  Lastly, in 
situations where the buyer does not trust the seller, the buyer would want 
more protection over unpermitted Leakage than W&I insurance.  However, 
barring these three exceptions, the LBM can also be used in a number of 
deal types like private equity, strategic, corporate, and carve-out deals 
where an isolated balance sheet exists.53
Lastly, where the CAM is generally viewed as a buyer-friendly 
mechanism, the LBM is generally viewed to be “more seller-friendly”54
because of its fixed price (and thus an inability for the buyer to renegotiate 
a lower price post-closing) and the fact that economic risk transfers at the 
Locked Box Date when the target company is still under seller 
management.55  In other words, the buyer bears the risk of any downturn in 
the target company between the Locked Box Date and closing.  The buyer 
also bears the risk of the seller lacking motivation to maximize the target 
company’s profits between the Locked Box Date and closing because the 
buyer, and not the seller, is entitled to the target company’s profits after the 
Locked Box Date.56  Further, the buyer’s primary protection from 
unpermitted Leakage is through carefully negotiated W&I insurance, which 
historically had been weak.  However, in recent years, the W&I industry 
has strengthened, which has increased buyer confidence.57
On the other hand, the LBM also provides certain buyer-friendly 
benefits.  For instance, the seller is not motivated to manipulate any post-
closing accounts by delaying capital expenditures to boost cash because the 
 52.  Matthew F. Hermann, Surveying the Landscape: Worldwide, 15 M&A J. 1, 8 (Sept. 
2014), http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Profiles(1)/M/MAJ_v1502.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9BUN-KGSY]. 
53 Id.; McGonigle & Weisser, supra note 3; Lawlor & Siegel, supra note 3, at 1. 
 54.  de Bernardini & Rootsey, supra note 3. 
55 O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 4. 
 56.  Mansfield & Parker, supra note 16, at 2.
 57.  Mergermarket Events, Sellers See Appeal of “Locked Box” Mechanism–CMS,
YOUTUBE (July 8, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CSyNcCUydw
[https://perma.cc/U2SG-6G3Z] [hereinafter Interview with Mergermarket] (discussing the 
improved reliability of the W&I market and the reduced premiums of insurance in the 
United Kingdom); McGonigle & Weisser, supra note 3, at 4 (discussing how recent 
competition in the W&I market has improved the terms and premiums of insurance in the 
United States). 
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balance sheet at closing does not affect the equity value.58  Even though a 
seller may be motivated to manipulate gaps in the Leakage protections or 
the representations and warranties set forth in the negotiated SPA, the seller 
may nevertheless be liable for any extraction of unpermitted Leakage or 
other value in the target company—W&I insurance aside—because the 
seller may be acting as a legal agent to the buyer between the Locked Box 
Date and closing.59  If this is the case, the seller would have fiduciary duties 
to the buyer and would be subject to the duty of care, duty of loyalty, and 
good faith.  According to one large accounting firm, Leakage claims are 
not common in practice—at least in the United Kingdom and across 
Europe.60  Additionally, the seller assumes the risk of running the target 
company on behalf of the buyer until closing.61  The seller does not receive 
any profits generated, and even though it receives proxy or interest 
payments for compensation, the payments may be set too low.62
In sum, the CAM is a buyer-friendly mechanism that is more accurate 
but comes at the heavy risk of lengthy and costly debates over post-closing 
adjustments.  The LBM is a seller-friendly mechanism that fixes the 
purchase price up front, limits disputes over pricing, and is quicker to 
execute; but, it may not be appropriate for complex carve-out or startup 
deals.  The LBM is a valuable alternative to the CAM due to its efficiency 
gains and cost savings, and American companies are leaving time and 
money on the table by not experimenting with the mechanism. 
The United States should increasingly use the LBM as an alternative 
pricing mechanism, and the next section explores possible explanations for 
why the LBM has not gained popularity in the United States. 
C. Why the LBM has not Become Popular in the United States 
There are a number of complex, interconnected factors that may have 
prevented the LBM from gaining popularity in the United States.  Three 
factors have been the most influential: (1) the volatility of the financial 
market, (2) the rise of carve-out M&A deals, and (3) the cultural and 
 58.  Mansfield & Parker, supra note 16, at 2.
 59.  It is unclear whether the seller is considered a de jure agent of the buyer; however, 
it is briefly suggested so in Mansfield & Parker, supra note 16, at 2.
 60. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 6.
61 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 7 (discussing a seller’s 
opportunity cost in running the company between the Locked Box Date and 
closing).
 62.  Purchase Price Adjustment Mechanisms in M&A Transactions – The Locked Box 
Mechanism, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 4 (Nov. 2014), http://winston.com/en/where-we-
are/europe/london.html#!/en/thought-leadership/purchase-price-adjustment-mechanisms-in-
m-a-transactions-the.html?aj=ov&parent=282&idx=13 [https://perma.cc/3ULS-GHZV].
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educational familiarity of the CAM as compared to the LBM in the United 
States.  Before discussing these primary factors, two related inquiries are 
addressed: whether any explanations can be derived from either the 
relationship between the LBM and strategic and financial deals63 or the 
litigious nature of the United States. 
First, the LBM has traditionally been popular in private equity deals 
and has only recently spread to strategic deals in the United Kingdom.64
This suggests that a discrepancy over the ratio of private equity deals to 
strategic deals between the United States and United Kingdom could be 
insightful.  In other words, if there are more private equity than strategic 
deals in the United Kingdom but the converse is true in the United States, 
the prevalence of the LBM may be attributable to the distinction in deal 
type.  However, no such discrepancy likely exists.  One study suggests that 
there are significantly more strategic deals than private equity ones in the 
United States.65  Another study shows significantly more strategic deals 
than private equity ones across Europe.66  This study aggregated data from 
the United Kingdom, which represented half of the total deal volume 
analyzed, France, and Germany.  Although this is not a perfect proxy 
because data from two additional countries are included, the general pattern 
and high proportion of data from the United Kingdom reasonably suggests 
that there are more strategic than financial deals in the United Kingdom.  
Thus, it seems likely that there are more strategic than private equity deals 
in both the United States and, by proxy, the United Kingdom, suggesting 
that the relationship between the number of strategic and financial deals has 
not influenced the prevalence of the LBM in the United States. 
Second, American companies may have been concerned about using a 
new pricing mechanism because “working out the kinks” may lead to 
unwanted litigation over improper execution of the mechanism by, for 
example, allowing unpermitted Leakage to flow from the target company.  
However, parties can contract this issue away by including mediation or 
 63.  Financial deals are backed by private equity firms and will be used synonymously 
in this Comment.  
 64.  Lawlor & Siegel, supra note 3, at 1. 
 65.  US M&A News and Trends, FACTSET 4 (July 2016), 
https://www.factset.com/websitefiles/PDFs/flashwire/flashwire_7.16 
[https://perma.cc/N8TV-GDPC].  See also Marc Martos-Vila et al., Financial vs. Strategic 
Buyers 1 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-098, 2014), 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/12-098_dc44025a-785b-45c5-9d31-
60e02f091b7d.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW5H-LDAM] (showing a greater volume of strategic 
versus financial deals in the United States). 
 66.  Europe M&A News and Trends, FACTSET 4 (2nd Quarter 2016), 
http://www.factset.com/mergerstat_em/europe/Europe_Flashwire_Quarterly.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7CX7-CR6C]. 
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alternative dispute resolution in the SPA.  Litigation would thus arise only 
under extenuating circumstances.  It is even possible that the LBM would 
have actually been a way to reduce litigation because there are less 
financial variables for the parties to dispute.  The most contentious aspect 
of a CAM transaction is handling post-closing adjustments, the point at 
which parties will attempt to renegotiate the purchase price.  This leads to 
disagreement and potential litigation.  With the LBM, the price is fixed at 
signing, which eliminates the potential for litigation on purchase price, and 
the primary point of concern is whether there has been any unpermitted 
Leakage extracted from the target firm, which is protected through W&I 
insurance—an industry that has strengthened in recent years, providing 
buyers with more confidence of proper protection in the case of 
unpermitted Leakage.67  The ability to require mediation or alternative 
dispute resolution in place of litigation through the SPA and the idea that 
the LBM may actually reduce litigation rather than increase it suggest that 
the litigious nature of the United States may not be a primary cause of the 
LBM’s lack of popularity in the United States. 
As these factors do not appear to have had a significant influence over 
the prevalence of the LBM in the United States, the remaining discussion 
focuses on the three primary factors that have likely contributed most to the 
LBM’s lack of popularity: the volatility of the financial market, the rise of 
carve-out M&A deals, and the educational and cultural familiarity with the 
CAM over the LBM. 
First, the volatility of the financial market following the global 
financial crisis left companies pessimistic about the market.  There was a 
39.72% drop in the number of United States M&A deals between 2007 
(pre-crisis) and 2009 (the year following the crisis that saw the lowest 
volumes and values of M&A activity), from 11,369 deals in 2007 to 6,853 
deals in 2009.68  In terms of deal value, there was a 54.26% drop from 
$1.23 trillion in 2007 to $568 billion in 2009.69  Even though there has been 
“[c]heap and plentiful capital” since the crisis, “it has been so difficult [for 
companies] to see the far horizon through the wild waves of market 
turbulence.”70  Thus, the normal effect of low cost capital in increasing the 
 67.  Interview with Mergermarket, supra note 57.
 68.  2015 M&A Report, WILMERHALE 2 (2015), 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Docume
nts/2015-WilmerHale-MA-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JGJ-SW9Y] (citing FactSet 
Mergers).  
 69.  Id.
 70.  Matthew Hermann, M&A is Back, THE M&A JOURNAL 1 (Sept. 2014), 
http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Profiles(1)/M/MAJ_v1502.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F23A-4C4V] (citing Rob Kindler, Vice Chairman and Global Head of 
M&A at Morgan Stanley). 
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amount of M&A deals was neutralized by uncertainty in the market.  Even 
when the market began to rise in 2013, companies were still concerned 
with the fluctuations, as “there were daily swings of 500 or 750 points.”71
With the uncertainty in the market, companies may have been less 
likely to experiment with new methods of pricing M&A deals following the 
crisis.  However, the market is stabilizing and this possible barrier to the 
LBM in the United States is dissolving.  In 2014, the number of United 
States M&A deals surpassed pre-crisis levels with 11,425 deals in 2014 
compared to 11,369 deals in 2007.72  The value of United States M&A 
activity also surpassed pre-crisis levels with $1.6 trillion worth of deals in 
2014 compared to $1.2 trillion in 2007 (and $568 billion in 2009).73
Additionally, buyers now are less concerned about the “macroeconomics of 
Fed manipulation” that may result in the “stock market . . . suffer[ing] 
some unforeseen calamity.”74  The “market now welcomes M&A deals 
with an enthusiasm not seen for some time” and “[s]hareholders now 
support M&A deals . . . .”75  The psychology of M&A also supports more 
deals.  CEOs are more confident and have a “renewed energy in M&A” as 
they no longer have to hold back an “actual launch” because of market 
uncertainty.76  It has been said, “If your pal in the same industry is doing a 
transaction, then it’s a good time for you to do a transaction because you 
won’t look silly for being the only guy doing a deal, . . . . This is always a 
major part of the psychology of M&A.”77
The volatile market may have played a significant role in preventing 
the LBM from gaining popularity in the United States, and the current 
revitalization in M&A suggests that the market may be well suited for 
companies to experiment with new ways to drive value like using the LBM 
in M&A deals. 
The second possible barrier is the rise in the carve-out deals in the 
United States.  When a company undertakes a carve-out, it divests one of 
its business units by selling an equity stake in that business or by spinning 
the business off into its own.78  A company may choose to undertake a 
carve-out for any of the following reasons: to focus the company’s 
attention on a particular business with “greater potential . . . growth,” “to 
 71.  Id.
 72.  WILMERHALE, supra note 68.
 73.  Id.
 74.  Hermann, supra note 70, at 3 (citing Alan Klein, Co-Administrative Partner at 
Simpson Thacher).  
 75.  Id. at 2.
 76.  Id.
 77.  Id. at 4.
 78.  Carve-Out, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/carveout.asp 
[https://perma.cc/Z6FC-X8KB] (last updated 2015). 
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dispose of non-core businesses,” to “[u]nlock [s]hareholder [v]alue,” to 
“[m]anage [c]apital [n]eeds,” to “[e]liminate [c]onflicts,” or to meet other 
financial pressures.79
The number of carve-out deals valued at over $100 million has been 
on the rise since 200980 and one study found that 39% of corporate 
respondents will pursue carve-outs as part of their strategy to focus on core 
assets (up from 31% in 2014).81  This rise may have played a role in 
preventing the LBM from gaining popularity in the United States because 
the mechanism requires historic balance sheets to determine an equity 
price.  For a complex carve-out deal, it may be difficult to isolate the 
divested business unit’s particularized financial data, as distinct from the 
seller’s other business lines.82  Thus, the LBM may not be the best 
mechanism to gauge a business’s value because it does rely on pricing 
adjustments.83
Although the rise in carve-outs may have played a role in preventing 
some companies from using the LBM, there is still a greater number of 
non-carve-out deals in the United States.84  This means that there are still 
ample deals where the LBM is appropriate.  Moreover, the LBM can still 
be effective when isolated financial statements for the carved-out business 
unit exists.  For instance, the LBM has spread readily to carve-out deals 
across Europe.85 This suggests that its use may only be limited in complex 
deals.
The third barrier, which is perhaps the most significant, is cultural and 
educational.  The CAM is part of the M&A culture in the United States and 
the concept of the LBM is novel to the majority of American companies.86
Companies that have made overseas mergers or acquisitions in the United 
Kingdom may have a loose familiarity with the LBM, but there has not 
 79.  Michael Flynn et al., The Art of Carving: Carve-Out Transactions – Sales of 
Divisions and Subsidiaries, GIBSON DUNN 10 (Feb. 5, 2015), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/WebcastSlides-Carve-Outs-
2.5.2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQG9-39FJ]. 
 80.  Id. at 5.
 81.  Russell Thomson et al., M&A Trends Report 2015: Our Annual Comprehensive 
Look at the M&A Market, DELOITTE 13 (2015), 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/mergers-acqisitions/us-ma-
trends-report15-042115.pdf [https://perma.cc/GAQ3-F5KB].
 82.  McGonigle & Weisser, supra note 3, at 2.
 83.  See footnote 6 for a discussion on why the CAM may be more appropriate for 
complex carve-out deals.
 84.  Flynn et al., supra note 79, at 5-6.
 85.  Hermann, supra note 52, at 9. 
86.   See McGonigle & Weisser, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that the LBM is still not used 
with any frequency in the United States but that some companies have started using the 
mechanism after “becoming educated on the pros and cons” of the it).   
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been a LBM spark in the United States as there has been in the United 
Kingdom and across Europe.87  Thus, the rational American company, 
especially in light of the recent economic environment, would not 
necessarily experiment with a new M&A pricing mechanism.  However, 
now that the market has improved and the number of M&A deals is 
reaching pre-crisis 2007 levels, companies may be more willing to 
experiment with deal structures that can generate more value and facilitate 
the merger or acquisition process. 
This Comment suspects that culture and education is one of the main 
reasons why the United Kingdom has seen such growth with the LBM.  
The mechanism has existed there for a number of years prior to gaining 
popularity.88  For instance, the LBM was used in approximately 40% of 
M&A transactions in the United Kingdom in 2007.89  The use then 
dramatically dropped following the global financial crisis from 2008 to 
early 2009, dropping to about 12% of deals.90  From 2009 to 2010, the 
LBM reached pre-crisis levels91 and today is used in approximately 57% of 
deals in the United Kingdom.92  In comparison, the LBM is used in only 
 87.  The LBM has also become popular in New Zealand and Australia. Nick 
Kovacevich, Trends in M&A, WYNN WILLIAMS, (Dec. 3, 2015), 
http://www.wynnwilliams.co.nz/Publications/Articles/Current-Trends-in-M-A 
[https://perma.cc/7UV5-6Q77]; Mansfield & Parker, supra note 16.
 88.  Mansfield & Parker, supra note 16, at 1 (stating that the “locked box mechanism[] 
rose in popularity in the United Kingdom in the mid-2000’s”).  
 89.  O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 2.
 90.  O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 2.  This decline is likely explained by the high 
levels of economic uncertainty resulting from the financial crisis.  Economic risk passes 
from the seller to the buyer at an earlier date with the LBM than with the CAM.  This means 
that the buyer would absorb any losses in the target following the Locked Box Date without 
having the ability to adjust the purchase price post-closing.  In contrast, economic risk 
passes from the seller to the buyer at closing with the CAM.  This means that the buyer is 
able to adjust the purchase price post-closing to reflect any losses of the target.  During the 
financial crisis, the value of a firm could drop drastically overnight.  Companies in the 
United Kingdom would have preferred to sacrifice simplicity and efficiency for precision in 
times of economic uncertainty.  Once the market began to stabilize, the LBM began rose to 
pre-crisis levels just a year later.  The LBM and CAM are strategic tools for companies to 
create value during deal formation, and the companies in the United Kingdom perfectly 
reflect the benefits of having alternative pricing mechanisms.
 91.  O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 2.





(finding that the closing accounts mechanism is used in roughly 85% of United States M&A 
deals and 43% of United Kingdom M&A deals, suggesting that the locked box mechanism 
or some other pricing mechanism is used in 15% of United States M&A deals and 57% of 
United Kingdom M&A deals). 
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about 15% of deals in the United States.93
One justification for the increased use of the LBM in the United 
Kingdom is that the flight-to-quality assets caused low deal activity, an 
environment where sellers could better dictate sale terms and rely on the 
LBM to fix the price of and expedite the deal.94  This was especially true in 
private equity deals, and sellers have been able to “resist a shift to the more 
traditional [CAM] which is perceived as offering a buyer more 
protection.”95  Additionally, it is important to note that the LBM has spread 
beyond private equity deals to corporate deals as well, where parties have 
been able to better tailor the mechanism to their needs.96
Following the global financial crisis, the United States market also 
suffered from low deal activity driven, in part, by a flight-to-quality 
assets.97  During this time, the United States and Europe shared similar 
M&A deal fluctuations post crisis.98  Where the number of M&A deals in 
Europe fell by 44.95% during 2007 and 2009 (13,389 deals in 2007 and 
7,371 deals in 2009),99 the United States experienced a 39.72% drop.100
Where deal value in Europe fell by 72.89% between 2007 and 2009 ($1.4 
trillion in 2007 and $379 billion in 2009),101 the United States experienced 
a 54.26% drop.102  If flight-to-quality was the driver for the increased use of 
the LBM, a parallel phenomenon should have occurred in the United 
States.  However, this was not the case. 
This is why the cultural and educational factor was most impactful.  
Because companies in the United Kingdom were already familiar with the 
LBM, they could recognize the benefits that came with fixing the price and 
expediting transactions post crisis.  If American companies had this 
familiarity, they may have also increased their usage of the LBM.  But the 
volatility of the market did not create appropriate conditions for companies 
to experiment with deal structures that companies were unfamiliar with—
 93.  Id.
 94.  McGonigle & Weisser, supra note 3, at 2.  In the context of M&A, flight-to-quality 
refers to buyers shifting their targets to high-quality, low-risk companies and is the result of 
uncertainty about the financial markets.  By nature, there are less high-quality, low-risk 
targets than medium- to high-risk ones.  Paired with the increased concentration of demand 
for these targets, the volume of M&A deals during a flight-to-quality market decreases. 
 95.  McGonigle & Weisser, supra note 3, at 2.
 96.  McGonigle & Weisser, supra note 3, at 2. 
 97.  Capital M&A Newsletter: M&A Market Activity Remains Strong Despite Economic 
Uncertainty, MACIAS, GINI & O’CONNELL, LLP (2011), 
http://www.mgocpa.com/idea/capital-ma-newsletter/ [https://perma.cc/E6HS-DBJD].
 98.  Note that this data compares M&A deals in the United States and Europe generally. 
 99.  WILMERHALE, supra note 68, at 3. 
 100.  WILMERHALE, supra note 68. 
 101.  WILMERHALE, supra note 68, at 3. 
 102.  WILMERHALE, supra note 68. 
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that would have only injected more uncertainty into the chaos.  Prudent 
shareholders and activist investors during this time period may not have 
been as willing to test new deal structures, but rely instead on structures 
they were familiar with to reduce risk.  Additionally, institutional 
shareholders represent “more than 70% of the largest 1,000 companies in 
United States in 2009.”103  Getting them to approve a LBM may have been 
challenging because savvy institutional shareholders may be more inclined 
to take the second opportunity to renegotiate a lower price with the CAM.  
Without being properly educated or having executed an LBM deal before, 
these institutional shareholders may not have been able to appropriately 
consider the LBM’s efficiency gains and cost savings.  On the other hand, 
there is also high institutional ownership in the United Kingdom and the 
LBM has continued to remain popular.104  This suggests that investors in 
the United Kingdom have not resisted and are comfortable with the benefits 
of the mechanism.  Thus, the cultural unfamiliarity with the LBM is likely 
the largest factor contributing to its minimal usage in the United States. 
With market conditions stabilizing, executives and shareholders 
favoring M&A transactions, and M&A deal volume increasing, the United 
States is ready for a new pricing mechanism.  Therefore, this Comment 
addresses what may be the largest hurdle in increasing LBM usage in the 
United States: the educational and cultural familiarity with the mechanism. 
From an educational perspective, this Comment, as a whole, serves to 
shed light on the LBM.  It is difficult to introduce a new system 
domestically based on international norms.  But the more the concept of the 
LBM is discussed, the more likely a company will experiment with it, and 
the more frequently the LBM will be used to drive value for companies. 
From the cultural perspective, there are noticeable differences between 
American and British transactions.  Specifically, the United States has 
many more earnout and MAC clauses than the United Kingdom.  Earnout 
clauses appear in roughly 38% of transactions in the United States and only 
16% of deals in the United Kingdom,105 and MAC clauses appear in nearly 
 103.  Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Stephen Davis, Are Institutional Investors Part of the 
Problem or Part of the Solution?: Key Descriptive and Prescriptive Questions About 
Shareholders’ Role in U.S. Public Equity Markets, COMM. FOR ECON. DEV. & YALE SCH. OF
MGMT. 4 (Oct. 2011), http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/millstein-
center/80235_CED_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/W279-ALFS]. 
 104.  Similar to the United States, the United Kingdom also has high institutional 
ownership. See Serdar Çelik & Mats Isaksson, Institutional Investors and Ownership 
Engagement, OECD J.: FIN. MARKET TRENDS 93, 94 (2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/Institutional-investors-ownership-engagement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9944-HW8T] (suggesting that 90% of public equity is held by institutional 
investors).
 105.  Interview with Mergermarket, supra note 57 (discussing the difference in the 
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all (93%) transactions in the United States, but are rare in the United 
Kingdom.106
First, earnout clauses are contractual solutions to valuation gaps 
between the buyer and seller that aid the parties in reaching a deal.107  They 
allow a seller to receive additional compensation, or part of the purchase 
price, by meeting certain economic and non-economic benchmarks post-
closing.108  Economic benchmarks may be based on performance indicators, 
such as “revenue, EBITDA, EBIT, net profit and cash flow from operating 
activities.”109  Non-economic benchmarks may be based on “official 
product approval or licensing, total incoming orders or the number of 
customers.”110  Earnout clauses require the seller to participate in the 
success of the firm even after economic interest has transferred.111  A 
typical earnout period is between one and five years, but may be longer 
depending on the specific deal.112
prevalence of earnout clauses between the United States and the United Kingdom). 
 106.  WILMERHALE, supra note 68, at 17. 
 107.  See Brian JM Quinn, Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: The Performance 
of Earnouts in Corporate Acquisitions, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 127, 130 (2012) (evaluating two 
theories behind the motivation for earnouts—the adverse selection theory, which states that 
earnouts help parties uncover hidden information from sellers, and the uncertainty theory, 
which states that earnouts manage uncertainty by allocating risk to the seller, thereby 
helping parties reach an agreement—ultimately finding that the uncertainty theory likely 
prevails).
 108.  Share Purchase Agreements: Purchase Price Mechanisms and Current Trends in 
Practice, ERNST & YOUNG 4 (2d ed. 2012), 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_TAS_-
_Share_Purchase_Agreements_spring_2012/$FILE/EY-SPA%20brochure-spring-
2012_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6E7-HCKY]; Earnout, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/earnout.asp?layout=infini.http://www.ey.com/Publicat
ion/vwLUAssets/EY_TAS_-_Share_Purchase_Agreements_spring_2012/$FILE/EY-
SPA%20brochure-spring-2012_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/XFV3-KG3N] (last updated 
2015); Erik Lopez, Introduction to M&A Earnouts, THE M&A LAWYER BLOG (July 10, 
2015), https://www.themalawyer.com/introduction-to-earnouts-in-ma-deals/ 
[https://perma.cc/QTG7-TN6R]. 
 109.  ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 108. EBITDA refers to earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization. EBITDA – Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation 
and Amortization, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/ebitda.asp 
[https://perma.cc/LJ3L-VRA7] (last visited July 27, 2016). EBIT refers to earnings before 
interest and tax. Earnings Before Interest & Tax – EBIT, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/ebit.asp [https://perma.cc/RXW5-MNUZ] (last visited 
July 27, 2016). 
 110.  ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 108. 
 111.  ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 108, at 2.
 112.  Paul M. Crimmins et al., Earn-outs in M&A Transactions: Key Structures and 
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Financially, earnout clauses can be important in striking a balance 
between what the buyer and seller believe are reasonable purchase prices; 
they are “a good way of bridging valuation-gaps and different opinions as 
to how the target company will develop.”113  For instance, imagine a 
company that is interested in acquiring a privately-held startup.  The 
founder is optimistic about his business and wants to sell today to acquire 
more capital to fund his expansion.114  The founder wants $100 million for 
the company, but the buyer is not convinced of that value even though it is 
intrigued by the business.  The buyer believes the company is worth around 
$75 million.115  To strike a balance of interests between both parties, an 
earnout clause allows the buyer to pay $50 million up front and up to $50 
million contingent on the acquired company meeting certain financial 
benchmarks.  Earnout clauses may be particularly valuable for financial 
deals where the buyer (i.e. a private equity firm) may not necessarily have 
the expertise to best manage the acquired company by keeping the sellers 
interested in the acquired company’s short-term performance post-
closing.116  This is not to say that economically-based earnout clauses are 
any less important for strategic transactions as well, as the earnout can 
motivate managers and directors from the acquired company to ensure its 
economic health. 
Earnouts with non-economic benchmarks are equally important.  For 
instance, in a strategic transaction, a buyer may be interested in particular 
purchase orders to expand its influence over a particular geographic 
market.117  Striking a deal contingent on the fulfillment of these purchase 
orders would have a significant impact on the purchase price.  Agreeing to 
an earnout clause helps alleviate disagreements over purchase price 
because of such non-economic factors, and it structures a more complete 
transaction.
Moreover, earnout clauses must be drafted carefully as both the buyer 
and seller have competing incentives.  During the earnout phase, the seller 
wants the acquired company to hit the agreed-upon economic or non-
 113.  ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 103, at 8. See Paul Crimmins et al., Earnouts in M&A 
Transactions, MAYER BROWN 3 (June 22, 2011), 
https://www.mayerbrown.com/public_docs/06-22-11_CorpSec_Webinar_Earnouts.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NPJ9-5G6L] (stating that “[e]arnouts can bridge . . . valuation gap[s] 
between an optimistic seller and a skeptical buyer”). 
 114.  Lopez, supra note 108. 
 115.  Lopez, supra note 108. 
116 Anne Field, How to Survive an Earnout, BLOOMBERG (June 20, 2005 12:00 
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2005-06-19/how-to-survive-an-
earnout [https://perma.cc/WK7Q-XE67]. 
 117.  See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 108 at 4 (noting that incoming orders may be used 
as a non-economic benchmark). 
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economic benchmarks so that it can receive the additional payments.  The 
buyer, on the other hand, does not want these benchmarks to be reached in 
order to minimize its payments to the seller.  To address this concern, 
covenants play an important role in protecting the interests of the parties.  
For instance, the seller will want to negotiate a covenant that prevents the 
buyer from diverting revenue from the acquired company that would 
prevent the benchmark from being met.118
Second, a MAC clause119 is a way for parties to “allocate who will 
bear the risk” in a transaction should a materially adverse change occur 
between signing and closing.120  A MAC clause “is the catchall 
provision”121 that “permits an acquirer to refuse to complete the transaction 
if a material and adverse change, as defined in the acquisition agreement, 
occurs to an acquiree prior to the time of completion of the acquisition.”122
Buyers may also invoke MAC by “taking advantage of either changed 
market conditions or adverse events affecting the target company”123 to 
renegotiate the deal, which may lead to a lowered price or restructuring.124
When buyers invoke a MAC clause, sellers have an incentive to settle at a 
lower price because they do not want to go through the hassle of litigation 
and because “the seller and its shareholders are typically happy to take the 
lower premium than risk litigation and an adverse decision resulting in no 
 118.  It is important for the seller to draft these covenants carefully.  For instance, a seller 
would not want to include language requiring the buyer to have “intent” to divert revenues 
for the purpose of reducing the earnout payments.  A seller would prefer to maintain a lower 
standard and eliminate reference to buyer intent because intent is difficult to prove in 
litigation.  Lazard Tech. Partners, LLC v. Qinetiq N. Am. Operations LLC, 114 A.3d 193, 
194 (Del. 2015) (finding that the buyer had not breached the covenant preventing the buyer 
from “divert[ing] or defer[ing] [revenue] with the intent of reducing . . . the Earn-Out 
Payment” because the covenant required proof that the buyer acted “with the intent” to 
reduce the payment—a high standard that the seller failed to prove). 
 119.  Also referred to as a materially adverse event (MAE) clause.  
 120.  Steven Davidoff Solomon, The MAC Is Back, but Does It Kill a Deal?, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 23, 2011 3:45 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/23/the-
big-mac-is-back-but-does-it-kill-a-deal/ [https://perma.cc/23N4-W8AY].  See also Robert T. 
Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC Clauses in Business 
Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2007, 2012 (2009) (evaluating how 
parties use MAC clauses to allocate deal risk based on existing theories of risk like the 
Gilson and Schwartz Investment Theory and a new theory proposed by the author, Professor 
Miller). 
 121.  STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR: SHOTGUN TAKEOVERS, GOVERNMENT BY
DEAL, AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IMPLOSION 56 (2009). 
 122.  Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 499 
(2009)(internal citation omitted). 
 123.  Solomon, supra note 120. 
 124.  Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case 
of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 869 (2010). 
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deal at all.”125  The buyer is also pushed to settle because it does not want to 
risk losing litigation (and thus the cost of litigating) and paying the original 
purchase price.126  Thus, the MAC clause is actually a powerful 
“renegotiation tool”127 rather than a get-out-of-jail-free card, a point 
reinforced by the rarity of court enforcement. 128
MAC clauses, like earnouts, must be drafted carefully.  They typically 
“describe (1) what must be materially adversely affected to constitute a 
MAC and (2) which effects will be disregarded in assessing whether a 
MAC has occurred.”129  Defining a materially adverse change, in practice, 
is difficult. The buyer will try to negotiate a broad definition of a materially 
adverse change to provide “leeway” to get out of a deal.130  The seller will 
conversely try to negotiate a narrow definition to shift as much risk as 
possible on the buyer.131  Generally, parties should negotiate a definition 
that specifies particularized conditions that may affect the business and 
include carve-outs for general changes in the economy or the target’s 
industry—risks that are traditionally born by the buyer.132  Even though 
MAC clauses have become rather standardized over the last few years and 
less time has been spent negotiating over terms,133 defining materially 
adverse remains a challenge.  For example, Delaware courts, where most 
MAC clause litigation is brought,134 have never found a materially adverse 
change135 and require such change to be in a “durationally-significant 
manner,” a high standard to meet.136  However, this understanding still 
provides little guidance.  Is one year enough or must it be two? Even with 
the challenges in defining materially adverse changes, MAC clauses appear 
in “virtually all [American] acquisition agreements”137 and are an important 
part of agreements in the United States. 
 125.  Solomon, supra note 120.
 126.  Solomon, supra note 120. 
 127.  Solomon, supra note 120. 
 128.  Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del. Ch. 
2008) (“Many commentators have noted that Delaware courts have never found a materially 
adverse [change] to have occurred in the context of a merger agreement.”). 
 129.  Katherine Ashton et al., MAC Clauses in the UK and U.S.: Much Ado About 
Nothing?, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON: INSIGHTS & NEWS (2013), 
http://www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/2013/12/mac-clauses-in-the-uk-and-us——
——much-ado-abo__ [https://perma.cc/4L7T-KQ7V].  
 130.  DAVIDOFF, supra note 121. 
 131.  DAVIDOFF, supra note 121.
 132.  Ashton et al., supra note 129. 
 133.  Ashton et al., supra note 129. 
 134.  Solomon, supra note 120. 
 135.  Supra note 128. 
 136.  In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
 137.  Ashton et al., supra note 129. 
2016] PRICING MECHANISMS IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 1255 
Earnout clauses and MAC clauses are important to the culture of 
M&A deals in the United States, but are less so in the United Kingdom,138
which may be part of the reason why the LBM has not gained popularity in 
the United States.  However, the LBM can be modified to better meet the 
expectations of buyers and sellers.139  Thus, modifying the LBM to reflect 
transactions in the United States can increase the use of the LBM 
domestically.  
III. MODIFYING THE LBM FOR THE UNITED STATES
The market is ready for a new pricing mechanism.  To persuade more 
American companies to use the LBM and reap the benefits that British 
companies have been enjoying for years (i.e. time and cost efficiency, price 
certainty, simplicity, and the ability to better meet party preferences), the 
mechanism must conform to the cultural deal expectations of American 
companies.  The LBM structure is flexible and has already been modified 
in the United Kingdom to better meet party preferences.140  Therefore, the 
LBM can be adapted for use in the United States, specifically, by 
structuring in MAC and earnout clauses. 
FIGURE 2.141
 138.  CMS HASCHE SIGLE, supra note 3, at 5; Interview with Mergermarket, supra note 
57.
 139.  McGonigle & Weisser, supra note 3, at 2.
 140.  McGonigle & Weisser, supra note 3, at 2. 
 141.  Created by author. 
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As previously stated, the M&A deals in the United Kingdom rarely 
have MAC clauses and include earnouts less frequently than in the United 
States.  Structuring the LBM to include these two provisions would better 
represent transactions in the United States.  The foundation of M&A 
pricing mechanisms in the United States is the CAM, which allows the 
buyer to make post-closing adjustments to reflect financial changes in the 
target company.  This leaves the control in the buyer’s hands, giving the 
buyer the opportunity to renegotiate a lower purchase price.  As a result, 
the CAM is generally viewed as buyer-friendly. 
Because the United States M&A market is accustomed to a buyer-
friendly mechanism, buyers may be reluctant to give up control through the 
use of a seller-friendly mechanism.  Even when the flight-to-quality in the 
United Kingdom likely caused an increase in the use of the LBM, the LBM 
was not readily adopted in the United States.  This left sellers in the United 
States, who would have had more negotiating power due to the mismatch 
between the number of buyers and the scarce amount of quality assets they 
were willing to purchase, with only the ability to negotiate better terms 
under a CAM rather than allowing them to negotiate a stronger fixed-price 
position. 
To get more parties to use the LBM in the United States, it would 
seem appropriate to address buyer concerns over the seller-friendly aspects 
of the LBM.  This is where the inclusions of MAC and earnout clauses 
serve a double purpose: they both structure the LBM to conform to the 
expectations of American companies and, in doing so, they balance out the 
seller-friendly nature of the mechanism. 
For a buyer, fixing the price at the SPA signing date can be risky.  
Should the business suffer a downturn between signing and closing, the 
buyer is unable to adjust the purchase price to reflect the then-current value 
at closing.142  Structuring in a MAC clause allows the buyer to walk away 
from the deal or renegotiate the price should a pre-defined materially 
adverse change occur to the company.  This is an important failsafe and 
negotiation tool for the buyer and provides the buyer with some leverage.  
This is not a perfect solution, as non-materially adverse changes that 
negatively impact the target company will still be borne by the buyer.  
However, if the target company is performing better after the Locked Box 
Date, the buyer will reap both the cash profits and the benefit of a lower 
relative purchase price because it was fixed at signing.  As with any choice, 
there will be tradeoffs.  Further, if a buyer in a particular deal values the 
efficiency of the LBM and does not want the hassle of potential post-
 142.  See supra text accompanying note 90 for a related discussion on the real-world 
implications of being unable to adjust the purchase price post-closing.
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closing adjustment disputes, the MAC clause can be a valuable tool for the 
buyer to retain more control over the deal—swinging the pendulum a little 
further away from the seller-friendly end of the spectrum towards the 
neutral center. 
Some argue that the MAC clause is at odds with the theory behind the 
LBM, which is a possible reason why MAC clauses are rare in the United 
Kingdom.143  Because risk passes from the seller to buyer at the Locked 
Box Date and the buyer is entitled to the cash profits of the target business 
during the executory period, “it arguably follows that the buyer should bear 
the risk of a MAC occurring in that period.”144
The buyer should bear the risk of downturns in the target business 
during this period, but the buyer should not bear the risk of a materially 
adverse change occurring.  First, typical MAC clauses in the United States 
carve out downturns in the target business’s industry or in the market as a 
whole.  This risk is still borne by the buyer.  This makes sense because the 
buyer receives the benefit of price certainty (i.e. no need to raise additional 
capital should the purchase price increase,145 less disputes over post-closing 
adjustments, less time spent drafting the SPA, etc.) and the benefit of cash 
profits during the period.  If the buyer bore no financial risk of any 
downturn in the target business, the mechanism would be unfair and no 
seller would agree to it.  This conforms to the classic notion of caveat
emptor.146  Second, although the buyer should bear some risk, it should not 
bear all the risk.  If there were no MAC clause in an agreement and the 
target company underwent a materially adverse change, there could be 
virtually no value to the target company, and thus, no purpose in the 
acquisition or merger.  The buyer would incur monumental losses in an 
unfair transaction.  As a matter of policy, the MAC clause prevents two 
companies in an M&A agreement from failing should one party fail.  Third, 
a materially adverse change is rarely found even when a MAC clause is 
present.  Recall that the Delaware courts have never found a materially 
adverse change.147  Only in dire circumstances will a court find that a MAC 
has occurred.  But this is not a clause without teeth.  If a major event 
happens to the target company, a buyer may use the MAC clause as a 
renegotiation tool to get to a fairer purchase price.  Thus, the MAC clause 
 143.  Ashton et al., supra note 129. 
 144.  Ashton et al., supra note 129. 
 145.  O’Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 5. 
 146.  Caveat emptor translates to “let the buyer beware” and is a commonly referred to 
adage in contract law.  It suggests that the buyer should assume the risk associated with his 
purchase. Caveat Emptor, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/caveat_emptor [https://perma.cc/5BF2-YL8T] (last visited 
June 26, 2016).
 147.  Solomon, supra note 120. 
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protects the buyer or gives the buyer breathing room in extreme cases; the 
buyer still bears the risk of loss under normal operating conditions. 
In addition to including a MAC clause, structuring in an earnout 
clause can better reflect the expectations of American parties and shift the 
pendulum even closer toward neutral ground between buyer- and seller-
friendliness.  The earnout clause provides the buyer with the comfort that 
the acquired company will trend toward the projections the original 
purchase price was based off of.  This clause keeps the seller honest.  The 
seller may be able to upsell or hide certain weaknesses during negotiation, 
but the earnout provides additional incentive for the seller to maintain an 
interest in the progress of the acquired company.  The earnout also provides 
a balance to the price fixing at SPA signing.  If a buyer believes the seller is 
overvaluing the company unreasonably, the buyer can rely on the earnout 
to structure a fair price for both parties.  The buyer would negotiate a lower 
initial purchase price and pay additional compensation to the seller 
contingent on the subsequent performance of the acquired company.148
This shifts more control and assurance to the buyer and can make an 
upfront fixed price seem more reasonable. 
It can be argued that an earnout clause complicates what is supposed 
to be a simpler pricing mechanism.  Where the LBM seeks to reduce 
disputes based on post-closing adjustments, the earnout can be effectively 
seen as the same: adjustments to the purchase price are made after closing 
and disputes may arise over how to calculate or whether certain 
benchmarks have been met.  This may also suggest that the net effect of the 
earnout clause is the same as having post-closing adjustments: the total cost 
to purchase a target company is amended based on performance. 
This concern does not exist for non-economic benchmarks, where 
payment is contingent on conditions like licensing or purchase orders being 
met.  This is pretty straightforward because the condition is either met or it 
is not met.  The situation gets complicated when discussing economic 
benchmarks.  There are parallels between the earnout and post-closing 
adjustments, but these parallels only go so far.  First, it is important to 
consider the potential effects of both post-closing adjustments and earnout 
clauses.  The net effect of post-closing adjustments is more material to the 
overall transaction than an earnout clause.  A dispute over post-closing 
adjustments can significantly delay a deal because it affects the final 
closing price of a transaction.  A dispute over whether a target company 
has reached a projected benchmark does not delay a deal because the deal 
has already closed at a set purchase price.  The contingent payments are an 
opportunity for the seller to receive more money based on the continued 
 148.  See previous example, supra page 45. 
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performance of the acquired business; disputes have nothing to do with 
whether or not a deal closes.  Second, it is true that including an earnout 
clause adds an extra degree of complexity to the LBM.  However, in order 
to customize the mechanism to meet American expectations, modifications 
must be made.  The LBM, in its simplest form, has not spread across the 
United States, and American companies are missing out on the benefits the 
mechanism has to offer.  To make the mechanism more appealing to 
American parties requires a bespoke approach.  Modifications will 
inevitably add a degree of complexity to the LBM template, but the 
benefits of the mechanism remain the same when compared to a CAM deal 
that also has an earnout clause, which further complicates an already 
complex mechanism.  And third, I believe that the buyer should work to 
negotiate a shorter earnout period with the seller unless inappropriate (a 
short earnout period may not be possible for certain non-economic 
benchmarks like patent approval).  The spirit of the LBM is to facilitate 
deals.  Keeping a seller on the hook for greater than five years is a long 
time to await potential payment. 
An earnout clause may not be appropriate in every deal and it may be 
more appropriate in certain types of deals than others.  For instance, 
earnouts are especially popular with private equity transactions where the 
private equity buyer may not have the expertise at the time of purchase to 
run the company.149  However, earnouts also exist in strategic deals as well.  
This discussion does not fix an earnout clause in every modified LBM deal 
in the United States; it simply suggests that an earnout clause come 
standard in the agreement.  Parties can choose to negotiate the clause out if 
needed.
A modified LBM for the United States would include both MAC and 
earnout clauses as standard.  This shifts some control back towards the 
buyer’s perspective, making the LBM more neutral rather than seller-
friendly.  These clauses will make the LBM more reflective of transactions 
in the United States and provide more comfort to buyers who are 
accustomed to a more buyer-friendly pricing mechanism.  The LBM, as 
popularized in the United Kingdom, has not become popular in the United 
States.  Hopefully, these suggestions will help companies consider using 
the modified LBM as a value-creating mechanism in future M&A 
transactions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The LBM is not used with any frequency in the United States but is 
 149.  Field, supra note 116.
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popular in the United Kingdom.  Many factors have contributed to this 
discrepancy including unstable market conditions and cultural unfamiliarity 
with the mechanism.  Because the market has stabilized, American 
companies are well positioned to explore the benefits of the LBM: time and 
cost efficiency, price certainty, simplicity, and the ability to better meet 
party preferences.  Thus, this Comment sought to familiarize readers with 
the LBM and suggest modifications to the mechanism that would better 
meet the expectations of American companies, which will hopefully have 
the effect of increasing LBM usage in M&A deals in the United States.  In 
an industry steeped in complexity, a method based on efficiency and 
simplicity can have profound transactional benefits; all that is required is 
some “in the box” thinking. 
